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THE PHILOSOPHY UNDERLYING SECTION 385
REGULATIONS: A CRITICAL EVALUATION
Jesse V. Boyles III*
In the Tax Reform Act of 19691 Congress expressed concern re-
garding the economic and social consequences of the increase in corpo-
rate mergers and the frequent use of debt in corporate acquisitions.2
Since such activity was encouraged, in part, by the favorable tax conse-
quences accorded debt as opposed to stock,3 the House enacted section
279 of the Internal Revenue Code.4 In general, this provision disallows
a corporate interest deduction with respect to certain types of indebted-
ness issued in conjunction with corporate acquisitions.5 Thus, section
279 resolves the question of whether interest payments are deductible
as interest in the limited context of corporate acquisitions. The Senate,
in addition to adopting section 279, appreciated the necessity of provid-
ing rules for distinguishing debt from equity in situations other than
corporate acquisitions.6 It was acknowledged, however, that the vari-
ety of contexts where this distinction mattered made it too difficult to
enact comprehensive and specific statutory rules.7 Therefore, section
385 was enacted to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe
appropriate regulations to determine whether an interest in a corpora-
tion is to be treated, for all taxation purposes, as stock or indebtedness.8
Congressional intent was that the regulations set forth factors to deter-
mine the existence of either a debtor-creditor or a corporation-share-
* Associate Professor of Accounting, University of Florida; Partner, Jesse V. Boyles, C.P.A.
B.S.B.A., University of Florida; Ph.D., University of Florida.
1. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487-(1969).
2. S. RaP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1969).
3. H.R. RaP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1969).
4. I.R.C. § 279 (1976). All references in this paper to the Code refer to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, as amended.
5. Id.
6. S. REP. No. 552, supra note 2, at 138.
7. Id.
8. I.R.C. § 385(a) (1976).
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holder relationship.9 More than ten years after the enactment of
section 385 the Secretary issued proposed regulations;l° and on Decem-
ber 29, 1980, the Secretary issued final regulations under this Code pro-
vision. 11 However, due to the controversial nature of these regulations,
the Secretary extended the original deadline for application of these
regulations from May 1, 1981, until January 1, 1982, in order to pro-
vide more time for the public to understand these regulations and for
the Secretary to consider their effectiveness. 12  Then, on January 5,
1982, the Secretary proposed changes in these regulations and extended
the deadline for application until June 30, 1982.13
In light of the problems encountered in drafting and implementing
these regulations, it seems appropriate to question the propriety of the
Secretary's philosophical approach to this very difficult area. 4 This
Article will identify and evaluate the theoretical justifications for the
specific rules contained within the regulations distinguishing debt from
equity. This Article is concerned with identifying and evaluating the
appropriateness of the theoretical concepts upon which the Secretary's
regulatory rules are based without addressing the mechanics of the
9. I.R.C. § 385(b) (1976).
10. Income Tax Treatment of Certain Interests in Corporations as Stock or Indebtedness, 45
Fed. Reg. 18,957 (1980) (proposed Mar. 24, 1980). For comments concerning the proposed regula-
tions, see generally Erickson, Capitalization of Close Corporations After 1980, 17 IDAHO L. REV.
139 (1980); Gersham, Debt-Equity Proposals Provide Guidance But Pose Problemsfor Small Corpo-
rations, 53 J. TAX'N 194 (1980); Pike, Proposed Debt-Equity Regs: Potent New Standards/or Char-
acterizing Purported Debt, 7 J. CORP. TAx'N 195 (1980); Comments Regarding Proposed
Class/fication oDebt and Equity, 34 TAx LAW. 757 (1981).
11. T.D. 7747, 45 Fed. Reg. 86,438 (1980). For comments concerning the final regulations,
see generally Bloom & Bush, Final Regulations Under Section 385 Contain Complex Rules and Safe
Harbors, 54 J. TAX'N 274 (1981); Bloom & Bush, Pinpointing the Problem Areas that Still Exist
Under the Final Section 385 Regulations, 54 J. TAX'N 322 (1981); Bush, The Debt-Equity Regula-
tions: Do Stock Redemptions and Other Areas Require Special Attention?, 39 INST. ON FED. TAX'N
1 (1981); Hamilton, InternalRevenue Code: Section 385 Sets Stock-or-Debt Rules, 56 CAL. ST. B.J.
278 (1981); Levin & Bowen, The Section 385 Regulations Regarding Debt Versus Equity. Is the
Cure Worse than the Malady?, 35 TAX LAW. 1 (1981).
12. T.D. 7774, 46 Fed. Reg. 24,945 (1981).
13. Treatment of Certain Interests in Corporations as Stock or Indebtedness, 47 Fed. Reg.
163, 164 (1982) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 15A) (proposed Jan. 5, 1982). The revised
proposed §§ 1.385-1 to -8 regulations may be found at 47 Fed. Reg. 170-87 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Reg. § 7 (1982)]. For a comparison of the old and new § 385 regulations, see Bloom &
Bush, New ProposedRegulations on Section 385: How They Compare to the Prior Final Regs, 56 J.
TAX'N 153 (1982). See infra note 261 for most recent deadline extention.
14. One commentator has stated, "No more frustrating and wasteful area exists in all of tax
law." Dixon, The Interest-Dividend Syndrome: What Are the Criteria Now?, 24 INST. ON FED.
TAX'N 1267, 1267 (1966); see also Plumb, The Federal Income Tax Signffcance ofCorporate Debt:
A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAx L. REv. 369, 370 (1971) (This article exhaustively
covers all aspects of the debt-equity question through 1971.).
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The classification of an interest as stock or indebtedness is signifi-
cant to the corporation because of the resulting tax consequences. A
debt arrangement allows the corporation to deduct all interest paid,
whereas under an equity arrangement, no deduction is allowed for dis-
tributed dividends.1 6 Properly structured debt permits the shareholder
in a closely-held corporation to withdraw capital either tax-free or at
favorable, long-term capital gain tax rates rather than as ordinary divi-
dend income.17 Although in some cases, debt does not create any tax
advantage over stock if the investment becomes worthless, there are
some situations in which debt losses are treated more favorably than
equity losses."' The classification of an interest in a corporation as
stock or indebtedness may be significant when a corporation attempts
to qualify for subchapter S treatment.' 9 The tax status accorded the
various interests in a liquidated subsidiary will determine whether that
entity is insolvent. This determination can vitally affect the tax results
associated with the liquidation transaction.2" These examples illustrate
the significance of the debt-equity classification to businessmen and tax
practitioners.2'
I. IDENTIFICATION OF THE UNDERLYING
PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH
An early case distinguished a shareholder from a creditor as fol-
lows: "The shareholder is an adventurer in the corporate business; he
takes the risk, and profits from success. The creditor, in compensation
for not sharing the profits, is to be paid independently of the risk of
success, and gets a right to dip into the capital when the payment date
arrives. ' 22 Debt is "[an unqualified obligation to pay a sum certain at
a reasonably close fixed maturity date along with a fixed percentage in
15. The details of the regulations will be described only to the extent necessary to evaluate
the underlying philosophical approach. Clearly, there will be omissions and oversimplifications,
but these do not appear significant with respect to either the evaluations or conclusions of this
Article.
16. Becker, Classpfcation ofan Interest in a Corporation As Stock or Indebtedness-New Regu.
lations to Internal Revenue Code Section 385, 29 U. KAN. L. REV. 213, 214 (1981); Plumb, supra
note 14, at 372-78; see also H.R. REP. No. 413, supra note 3.
17. Plumb, supra note 14, at 378-83.
18. Id. at 383-86; see Becker, supra note 16, at 214-15.
19. Becker, supra note 16, at 216; Plumb, supra note 14, at 390-92.
20. Plumb, supra note 14, at 387-90.
21. Countless other examples are available to explain the importance of the debt-equity clas-
sification. See id. at 392-404; Becker, supra note 16, at 216-17.
22. Commissioner v. O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1935); see also United
[Vol. 17:672
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interest payable regardless of the debtor's income or lack thereof. 23
Courts generally treat the debt-equity classification issue as a fact ques-
tion, analyzing all of the relevant facts and circumstances associated
with the creation of a particular interest in order to reach an informed
conclusion regarding whether a shareholder or a creditor relationship
was established based upon a theoretical distinction between the two
relationships.24
Early cases indicate that courts distinguished debt from equity by
construing the documents associated with the transaction or, if there
were no documents, by examining the corporation's accounting en-
tries.25 The formal rights and remedies of creditors, as distinguished
from those available to stockholders, include the following evidentiary
factors: A fixed maturity date within a reasonable time from the crea-
tion of the interest;26 specifically stated remedies for default;27 subordi-
nation of the particular interest in question relative to other interests in
the corporation;28 certainty of payment to the interest holder;29 absence
of interest or interest at a nominal rate;30 terms allowing the holder of
the interest to participate in the success of the venture;3 provisions in-
dicating that the holder of an interest is participating in both the suc-
cess and the failure of the venture;32 participation in management of
the venture;33 language used in the documents;34 rights upon dissolu-
tion of the venture;35 and rights to modify the terms of the
documents.36
States v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 133 F.2d 990, 993 (6th Cir. 1943); Commissioner v. Meridian &
Thirteenth Realty Co., 132 F.2d 182, 186 (7th Cir. 1942).
23. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 402-03 (2d Cir. 1957).
24. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
25. Plumb, supra note 14, at 405-06.
26. Id. at 413-20.
27. Id. at 420-21.
28. Id. at 421-30.
29. Id. at 430-32.
30. Id. at 432-34.
31. Id. at 434-41.
32. Id. at 442-47.
33. Id. at 447-50.
34. Id. at 450-57.
35. See S. Glaser & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 3 TAX CT. MEm. DEc. (CCH) 611, 612
(1944); see also Ludwig Baumann & Co. v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 557 (2d Cir. 1963); Air-Vent
Aluminum Awning Mfg. Co. v. United States, 66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)1 9115, 16 A.F.T.R.2d
(P-H) 65-5233 (S.D. Cal. 1965); Aronov Constr. Co. v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 175 (N.D.
Ala. 1963), aft'd, 338 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1964).
36. See Elko Lamoille Power Co. v. Commissioner, 50 F.2d 595, 597 (9th Cir. 1931); Motel
Co. v. Commissioner, 22 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 825, 831 (1963), a f'don other grounds, 340
F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1965).
19821
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It soon became apparent that the limitations upon the rights of
creditors, which must be carefully spelled out in instruments involving
outside investors, may exist as tacit understandings when common
shareholders or closely related parties themselves apply funds." Thus,
in these situations courts must look beyond the terms contained within
the relevant documents to ascertain whether a particular investment
"constitutes risk capital entirely subject to the fortunes of the corporate
venture, or represents a strict debtor-creditor relationship. 38 Specifi-
cally, courts consider evidence relating to the intention of the parties to
create a debtor-creditor relationship. Factors indicating this intent in-
clude the following: Writings specifying the rights and remedies of the
investor;39 declarations of the parties;4" security interests placing the
investor in a position superior to general creditors; the presence of a
sinking fund, or some other similar device to provide for the ultimate
retirement of the debt;4' debt holdings of shareholders in substantially
the same proportions as their holdings of corporate stock;42 guarantees
made by shareholders;4 3 payment history of the interest;44 failure to
enforce the terms of an instrument in default;45 voluntary subordina-
tion to other creditors;46 the results of a change of ownership;47 an as-
certainable principal amount;48 package financing consisting of debt
and equity with free transferability of the various components; 49 timing
of the creation of the particular interest;50 and, the effect of the particu-
lar interest in providing additional resources to the corporation.5
37. Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, 17 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 771, 779
(1959).
38. Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 697 (3d Cir. 1968).
39. Plumb, supra note 14, at 461-64.
40. Id. at 465-66.
41. Id. at 466-70.
42. Id. at 470-82.
43. Id. at 482-90.
44. Id. at 490-92.
45. Id. at 493-96.
46. Id. at 497-99.
47. Id. at 499-503.
48. Sherwood Memorial Gardens, Inc. v. Commisioner, 350 F.2d 225, 228 (7th Cir. 1965); see
also Jordan Co. v. Allen, 83 F. Supp. 437 (D. Ga. 1949); Knollwood Memorial Gardens v. Com-
missioner, 46 T.D. 764, 781 (1966).
49. See Fellinger v. United States, 363 F.2d 826 (6th Cir. 1966); see also United States v.
Haskel Eng'g & Supply Co., 380 F.2d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 1967); Intermountain Furniture Mfg. Co.
v. United States, 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9735, 20 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 1 67-5209 (D. Utah
1967); Riverside Co. v. United States, 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) V 9489, 16 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)
65-5026 (D. Ga. 1965).
50. See Smith v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1967); Henderson v. United States,
245 F. Supp. 282 (D. Ala. 1965).
51. Sayles Finishing Plants, Inc. v. United States, 399 F.2d 214, 218 (Ct. CI. 1968); see also
[Vol. 17:672
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Additionally, courts consider evidence regarding economic risk.52
Business or economic risk may prevent judicial recognition of debt
even when an analysis of the facts and circumstances reveals unambig-
uous intentions of the parties to create a debt. Evidentiary factors con-
cerning business risk include the following: Subordination of the
particular interest to other corporate interests;53 protection of the inter-
est by adequate security;54 proportionate holdings of the particular in-
terest by the shareholders in substantially the same proportion as stock
holdings; 55 payment history of the interest;56 thin or inadequate capital-
ization;57 corporate use of the advanced funds;5" expected source of the
principal and interest;59 probability of a loan on similar terms by an
independent creditor;6" and the survival prospects of the corporation.6'
This procedure concentrates upon evidence regarding the terms in
£he documents, the actions of the parties to the transaction, and the risk
of the business, to ascertain whether the investor can collect, regardless
of the success of the venture. However, this procedure is virtually im-
possible to apply in a logical sense because any investment involves
some risk of loss, and its subsequent recoupment is thus dependent, to
some extent upon the success of the venture. Essentially, there are
high-risk equity investment possibilities as well as conservative equity
investment possibilities. Similarly, there are conservative, relatively
safe loans as well as risky loans. Furthermore, some investors are will-
ing to accept a greater amount of risk for a greater potential return,
while others are not. Therefore, the distinction between risk capital
and a risky loan is an elusive categorization.62 One judicial opinion
Foresun, Inc. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 706, 714, 716 (1964), a 'dand modied, 348 F.2d 1006 (6th
Cir. 1965).
52. Is the risk the type of risk that a reasonable and prudent creditor would take or is it more
in the nature of a risk which would be associated with a stockholder? See generally Gilbert v.
Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 407 (2d Cir. 1957).




57. Id. at 507-19.
58. Id. at 520-25.
59. Id. at 526-29.
60. Id. at 530-35.
61. Id. at 535-37.
62. In Slappey Drive Indus. Park v. United States, 561 F.2d 572, 581 (5th Cir. 1977) the court
observed: "Generally, shareholders place their money 'at the risk of the business' while lenders
seek a more reliable return." This statement of course, glosses over a good many considerations
with which even the most inexperienced investor is usually familiar. For example, a purchase of
General Motors stock may bear less risk than a bona fide loan to a small corporation. Therefore,
1982]
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concluded, "It does not help in the solution of the problem to speak of
the man who invests in stock of a corporation as the one who takes the
risks and the creditor as the one who seeks a definite obligation payable
in any event."63
It is possible to argue that the difference between a shareholder
and a creditor lies in the nature64 and degree65 of the risk assumed. 66 If
this is the case, it seems clear that each situation involving the debt-
equity issue must be resolved on the basis of its own unique set of facts.
A great deal of confusion results if one specific fact is examined out of
context. For example, in one case the court observed a 692:1 ratio and
still determined that a particular interest was debt;67 yet in another case
the court observed a 1:1 ratio and determined that a particular interest
was equity.68 It follows that courts, in deciding particular cases, have
not been able to establish objective guidelines with respect to specific
evidentiary factors. 69 As a result of this situation, commentators seek-
ing to identify objective standards in this field by analyzing judicial
the amount of risk in an advance to a corporation is never determinative of whether the advance is
a contribution to capital or a bona fide loan.
63. Byerlite Corp. v. Williams, 286 F.2d 285, 292 (6th Cir. 1960).
64. Concerning the question whether it is the creditor's risk that the business will become
insolvent and ultimately fail or will alternately prosper and endure, see generally, e.g., Sherwood
Memorial Gardens, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 211, 229 n.10 (1964), at'd, 350 F.2d 225 (7th
Cir. 1965).
65. If the interest is to be considered a debt there must be a reasonable expectation of repay-
ment regardless of the success of the venture. See Santa Anita Consol., Inc. v. Commissioner, 50
T.C. 536, 552 (1968).
66. Diamond Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 725, 732 (3d Cir. 1963); Affiliated Re-
search, Inc. v. United States, 351 F.2d 646, 648 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
67. Baker Commodities, Inc. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 374, 396 (1967), a f'd on other
grounds, 415 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 988 (1970).
68. Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 408, 419 (1954), aI'd, 236 F.2d 159(6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957); see Caplin, supra note 37, at 784-88 (outlining
the Gooding case).
69. One court has described the decisions as "defying symmetry." Tyler v. Tomlinson, 414
F.2d 844, 847 (5th Cir. 1969); see Plumb, supra note 14, at 407-08. The drafters of the regulations
also acknowledge this point. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg.
18,957, 18,958 (1980); see also United States v. Uneco, Inc., 532 F.2d 1204, 1207 (8th Cir. 1976) (a
court may apply various relevant factors to one case but not to another); Gooding Amusement Co.
v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159, 165 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957) (each case is
to be determined on its own set of facts). Perhaps the most famous judicial reaction to the task of
distinguishing debt from equity is found in Sansberry v. United States, 70-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9216 n.4 (S.C. Ind. 1970), in which Judge Dillin cites the definition of pornography by Justice
Stewart: "[P]erhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly [defining it]. But I know it when I see
it .... " Id. at 82,862 (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring)); see also Note, Toward New Modes of Tax Decisionmaking-The Debt-Equity Imbroglio and
Dislocations in Tax Lawmaking Responsibility, 83 HARV. L. Rv. 1695, 1705-07 (1970) (Without
legislative guidance, courts would never arrive at an absolute solution to debt-equity issue because
there exists no overriding policy or principle to guide their decisions.).
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decisions have tended to conclude that such standards do not exist.70
A review of the regulations discloses that the Secretary has at-
tempted to distinguish between capital and debt by utilizing a philo-
sophical approach which may be described as "substantial conformity
with economic reality" or "conformity with arm's length standards. 7 1
In fact, there are twelve classification provisions, 2 ten of which classify
the interest based upon the parties' conformity to arm's length stan-
dards.73 This theoretical approach is probably derived from the judi-
cial concept of substance over form.74 Many courts have held that
application of substance over form to the debt-equity controversy re-
quires an inquiry concerning the conformity of the stated classification
to substantial economic reality.75
When the lenders are also the shareholders of a closely-held cor-
.poration, application of the doctrine of substance over form may be
particularly appropriate. One appellate court has commented:
In a corporation which has numerous shareholders with vary-
ing interests, the arm's length relationship between the corpo-
ration and a shareholder who supplies funds to it inevitably
results in a transaction whose form mirrors its substance.
When the corporation is closely held, however, and the same
persons occupy both sides of the bargaining table, form does
not necessarily correspond to the intrinsic economic nature of
70. See Dixon, supra note 14, at 1267-68; Plumb, supra note 14, at 407-10; see also, Note
supra note 69, at 1705-07.
71. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, supra note 69, at 18,958; see Sup-
plementary Information to Proposed Regulations, infra note 78, at 169.
72. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385 (1982). The regulations contain both "operational" and "classifi-
cation" provisions. As used in this Article, the term "operational provision" will encompass any
test or rule employed by a classification provision. "Classification provision" will mean any provi-
sion which actually classifies a specific interest as debt or equity.
73. Six of the ten provisions deal with the creation of arm's length terms by the parties. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(a), -6(c), -6(e), -6(g), -6(m)(l), -7 (1982). The other four deal with the arm's
length enforcement of an instrument's terms. See id. § 1.385-6(1), -6(m)(2), -6(m)(3), -6(k). The
other two provisions do not appear to involve arm's length relationships. See id. § 1.385-6(d),
-8(a).
74. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935), explaining:
The rule which excludes from consideration the motive of tax avoidance is not pertinent
to the situation, because the transaction upon its face lies outside the plain intent of the
statute. To hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above reality and deprive the statu-
tory provision in question of all serious purpose.
Id. at 470.
75. See Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957). The "Gregory principle," as it
is called in Gilbert, requires a determination of "whether the characterization urged by the tax-
payer accords with substantial economic reality." Id. at 406; accord J.S. Biritz Constr. Co. v.
Commissioner, 387 F.2d 451, 456 (8th Cir. 1967); Barton Theatre Co. v. Commissioner, 40 TAx
CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 198, 202 (1980); Litton Business Systems, Inc., 61 T.C. 367, 377 (1973).
8
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the transaction, for the parties may mold it at their will with
no countervailing pull.76
Therefore, when instruments are issued to shareholders of a closely-
held corporation, the proper inquiry is whether a disinterested lender
would have advanced funds on terms similar to those agreed upon by
shareholders.77 The Secretary states that the regulations impact prima-
rily upon small, closely-held corporations.78 The obvious inference
from this statement is that conformity with economic reality is the ap-
propriate theoretical standard to be applied in these regulations.
II. FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN EVALUATING THE
ARM'S LENGTH STANDARD
The drafters of the regulations intend the debt-equity provisions to
provide both flexibility and certainty.79 Existing case law in the area
produced a high degree of flexibility with very little certainty.80 There-
fore, a proper evaluation of the Secretary's philosophical approach to
the debt-equity question necessitates an inquiry regarding whether
greater certainty has been provided by the imposition of the arm's
length standard, while sufficient flexibility has been retained for the
regulations to be responsive to "real world" investment circumstances.
It is the Secretary's attempted reconciliation of the apparently conflict-
ing demands between flexibility and certainty which will be evaluated.
Three primary factors should be considered when evaluating flex-
ibility and certainty. One consideration is the degree of difficulty in
understanding specific provisions. Rules which are difficult to under-
stand or to apply will indicate very little certainty.
76. Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 697 (3d Cir. 1968).
77. Scriptomatic, Inc. v. United States, 555 F.2d 364 (3d Cir. 1977) suggests an approach to
debt-equity questions which seems to be consistent with this general proposition:
Under Fin Hay, then, the ultimate issue is measurement of the transaction by objec-
tive tests of economic reality, and the touchstone of economic reality is whether the
transaction would have taken the same form had it been between the corporation and an
outside lender-whether, in sum, "the shareholder's advance is far more speculative than
what an outsider would make."
As is apparent, if there is proof or agreement that an outsider would have purchased
an instrument on the terms available to a shareholder, the question as to whether the
form of the obligation resulted from arm's-length negotiation is irrelevant to resolution
of the debt-equity issue. The crucial issue is the economic reality of the marketplace:
what the market would accept as debt is debt.
Id. at 367-68.
78. See Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 47 Fed. Reg. 164, 166 (1982).
79. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, supra note 69, at 18,958.
80. The variety and weight of the numerous evidentiary factors left little certainty. See supra
notes 25-70 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 17:672
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Since the regulations establish safe harbors which are intended to
provide certainty in treating an interest as indebtedness,"1 the safe har-
bor provisions are a second factor to consider. Broad safe harbors ap-
plicable to a large proportion of corporate taxpayers may indicate
adequate flexibility in establishing areas of certainty. Narrow safe
harbors indicate either certainty only at the cost of flexibility or flex-
ibility only if much uncertainty is accepted.
Flexibility is ostensibly provided by specific rules under which an
interest in a corporation may be treated as indebtedness, equity, or a
combination of both. 2 However, it may be argued that this is not the
appropriate interpretation of flexibility. Rather, the real issue implied
by the term "flexibility" is whether the Secretary has been successful in
drafting objective classification rules based upon abstractly defined 3
arm's length standards in order to provide greater certainty with re-
spect to the debt-equity issue,8 4 while at the same time remaining re-
sponsive to the myriad of factual situations associated with debt-equity
transactions. If this is accepted as the proper interpretation of flex-
ibility, the third factor to consider is whether the treatments specified
by particular provisions are responsive to the various fact situations
associated with debt-equity transactions. Provisions which require a
specific treatment and which have a wide scope of applicability allow
very little flexibility. On the other hand, provisions requiring specific
treatment, which have a limited scope of applicability, allow very little
certainty or flexibility.
These three factors will be used to evaluate the regulations under
section 385 with respect to the availability of flexibility and certainty.
III. EVALUATION OF SPECIFIC CLASSIFICATION PROVISIONS
The various classification provisions of the regulations will be di-
vided into two categories for purposes of this discussion: those provi-
sions applicable to all creditors, and those applicable only to creditors
who are also shareholders. No attempt will be made to discuss all of
the classification provisions contained within the regulations. Rather,
only those which are most relevant for drawing conclusions with re-
spect to the objective of the regulations will be discussed.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. They are abstractly defined because they are defined independently of any specific facts
and circumstances.
84. See supra notes 25-70 and accompanying text.
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A. Classification Provisions Applicable to All Creditors
Only one provision is applicable to all creditors and also con-
cerned with arm's length relationships."5 This provision, which oper-
ates to classify hybrid instruments 86 as debt or equity, 7 is based on the
premise that a hybrid instrument more closely resembles stock if the
value of its equity elements is greater than its value as a debt instru-
ment. This reasoning is enhanced if the instrument's value as a debt
interest is reduced by subordination of the instrument to other creditors
or by a low interest rate. 8 A mechanical test is applied to determine
the predominant characteristics of the instrument. The presumption is
that the total fair market value of a hybrid instrument embodies two
identifiable components. One is the value of the rights to separate fixed
payments of interest and principal. The second is the value of the
equity features, which is measured by the right to convert the instru-
ment into stock and the right to receive contingent payments.89 If at
least half of the fair market value of the instrument is attributable to
rights characteristic of indebtedness, the instrument may be classified
as indebtedness. 90 On the other hand, if the fair market value of the
instrument without its equity features is less than half of the actual fair
market value of the entire instrument, the instrument will be classified
85. Perhaps this an implicit recognition that the debt-equity problem most commonly arises
in closely-held corporations where the shareholders, often also acting as officers of the corpora-
tion, are able to control what label the corporation gives to the shareholder advance. See stfra
notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
Public corporations occasionally find the Service challenging the validity of purported debt,
but it would seem easier for a corporation with a large number of shareholders to survive the
attack. See, e.g., Monon R.R. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 345 (1970), acquiescedin, 1973-2 C.B. 3.
The regulations under section 385 recognize this dichotomy by creating safe harbors which
operate to exempt the instruments of public corporations from several of the classification rules
presumably on the grounds that the form of the instrument was the result of an arm's length
relationship. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a)(2)(ii), -6(a)(3)(i), -6(a)(3)(ii) (1982).
86. A hybrid instrument is defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(d) (1982) as an instrument that is
convertible into stock or one that provides for a contingent payment of interest or principal to the
holder. See Plumb, supra note 14, at 405 for a more complete explanation of the Secretary's
concern for hybrid instruments. These concerns provide the justification for the treatment speci-
fied under the regulations.
87. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5 (1982).
88. See Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, supra note 69, at 18,960.
89. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(d) (1982).
90. An instrument which escapes classification as stock under Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(a) (1982)
is treated as a straight debt instrument under § 1.385-2(b)(2). Therefore, it is subject to any of the
other special classification rules that are applicable to straight debt instruments. However, it
should be noted that the other classification rules will always operate to classify such an instru-
ment as debt unless the instrument is held by a shareholder, in which case there is a possibility
that the instrument may be classified as equity.
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as stock.91 This test is intended to replace the subjective multi-factor
analysis employed by the courts92 with an objective test while remain-
ing responsive to relevant judicially developed factors. 93
Two observations may be made regarding this standard objective.
First, the test is purely mechanical and thus precludes any flexibility.
The Secretary undoubtedly recognized that the primary purpose for is-
suing a hybrid instrument is to obtain a lower interest rate than that
available under a straight debt instrument. Yet, the fact remains that
reduced interest paid on the hybrid instrument operates to lower the
debt value of the instrument without its equity features and thus in-
creases the possibility that the instrument will be classified as stock.
The Secretary indicates an acceptance of corporations using sophisti-
cated financing instruments to lower their effective interest expense as
long as the interest costs are not reduced too much. In this connection,
it must be noted that section 1.385-8(a) does allow favorable treatment
of some debt instruments with an "equity-kicker." To obtain this fa-
vored status the corporation is required only to issue debt instruments
with nondetachable warrants rather than convertible debt instruments.
By use of this provision, a corporation may avoid the potential adverse
classification under section 1.385-5(a).
Second, the purely mechanical test will not provide greater cer-
tainty because it will be difficult to apply. Two separate calculations
must be made: the actual fair market value of the entire instrument,
and the fair market value of the instrument without its equity features.
Once the two values have been determined, the mechanical test objec-
tively determines whether the debt features or equity features are pre-
dominant. Although fair market value is generally understood94 it is
difficult to determine in specific fact situations.9" This is likely to create
numerous disputes between the Service and taxpayers regarding valua-
tion of debt and equity and fails to provide much certainty.
The fair market value of the entire instrument is apparently deter-
91. Id. § 1.385-5(a).
92. See supra notes 22-70 and accompanying text.
93. It remains responsive to these factors because the fair market value of an instrument
without its equity features is affected by the same factors that the courts have taken into account
whendetermining whether an instrument is debt or equity. Supplementary Information to Pro-
posed Regulations, supra note 69, at 18,960.
94. Fair market value is generally considered to be equal to the price at which an item would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, both having a reasonable knowledge of
all relevant facts and neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell. See, e.g., Treas. Reg.
§ 1.385-3(b)(1) (1982).
95. See infra notes 96-154 and accompanying text.
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mined under an operational provision which is stated in section 1.385-
3(a).96 This provision states that the fair market value of an instrument
is the price at which the instrument changes hands between a willing
buyer and willing seller, both having reasonable knowledge of all the
relevant facts.97 In an attempt to add certainty, the fair market value of
an instrument may be determined by using the present value and stan-
dard bond tables under section 1232 regulations.98 Furthermore, two
rules of convenience are provided. First, the fair market value of a
straight debt instrument on the day of issue is assumed to be equal to
the face amount if the stated annual interest rate is reasonable within
section 1.385-6(f), 9 9 and the consideration paid for the instrument is
equal to the face amount.' 00 Second, the fair market value of an instru-
ment on the day of issue is the issue price, as defined in section
1232(b)(2), if the instrument is registered with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission and sold to the public for money. 01
The drafters of section 1.385-3(a) claim that the difficulties nor-
mally associated with valuation are largely avoided for four reasons.10 2
First, appraisal is limited almost exclusively to straight debt instru-
ments, presumably because most of the hybrid instruments requiring
valuation will come within the rule of convenience of section 1.385-
3(a)(2)(ii) dealing with instruments registered with the SEC.1 3 How-
ever, there is no data readily available to evaluate the accuracy of this
assertion. Second, the appraisal of a straight debt instrument is simpli-
fied by using standard bond tables."° However, in order to use the
tables the proper discount rate must be determined. In the case of a
small closely-held corporation, the determination of the proper dis-
count rate may require as thorough an analysis of the corporation's
financial history and condition as that necessary to determine the fair
market value of its stock. Moreover, even the drafters of the provision
point out that many of the factors that a willing buyer and seller would
consider in arriving at an arm's length interest rate and, thus, a fair
market price for the instrument, are the same as the factors developed
96. Id. § 1.385-5(c)(9)(i).
97. Id. § 1.385-3 (a)(1)(i).
98. Id. § 1.385-3(a)(I)(ii).
99. Id. § 1.385-3(a)(2)(i)(A).
100. Id. § 1.385-3(a)(2)(i)(B).
101. Id. § 1.385-3(a)(2)(ii).
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by case law for distinguishing stock from indebtedness. 1 5 Thus, the
determination of the fair market value of even a straight debt instru-
ment is not a simple procedure and the stated objective of replacing
"the subjective analysis of case law with a definitive question"'10 6 has
not been attained. The third suggestion, that no great accuracy of ap-
praisal is required, 1 7 appears to be misleading since revenue agents
may define accuracy differently than the taxpayer. Fourth, the drafters
argue that the broad safe harbor under section 1.385-3(a)(2)(i) for
straight debt instruments will make it possible to avoid the need for
valuation altogether.'08 In fact, the safe harbor rule itself is difficult to
apply because of the requirement of a reasonable rate of interest on the
instrument within section 1.385-6(f).
The regulations establish the general rule that a stated annual rate
of interest is reasonable if it is comparable to the range of rates paid to
independent creditors on similar instruments by corporations in the
same general industry, geographic location, and financial condition on
the date the determination is made provided it is not less than the rate
specified in section 1.385-6(f)(2)(i)(A) for instruments of comparable
maturity.0 9 In addition, an alternative in the form of a rule of conven-
ience is provided so that corporations can avoid the uncertainty of the
general definition." 0 The stated rate of interest is presumed to be rea-
sonable if two conditions are satisfied. First, on the date the determina-
tion is made, the stated rate must be equal to the rate in effect under
section 6621,"' the prime rate in effect at any local commercial bank or
a rate two points above such rate,"I2 either of the endpoints of the range
of rates set forth in section 1.482-2(a)(2)(iii)(B)(1), or at a rate deter-
mined from time to time by the Secretary, taking into consideration the





109. Treas Reg. § 1.385-6(f)(1) (1982).
110. Id. § 1.385-6(0(2).
111. Under § 6621(b), the Secretary may adjust the interest rate in October of every second
year based on the adjusted prime rate charged by banks in September. The adjusted prime rate is
90% of the average predominant prime rate quoted by banks to large businesses, as determined by
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Treas. Reg. § 301.6621(b)(2) (1975). In
1982, the § 6621 interest rate is 20%. Rev. Rul. 80-260, 1980-44 I.R.B. 19.
112. "The term 'local commerical bank' includes any commercial bank at which the issuing
corporation ordinarily does business." Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f)(4) (1982).
19821
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States of comparable maturity.t13 Alternatively, the rate can be in be-
tween any two of the four rates described above." 14 Second, at the end
of the taxable year in which the determination is made, the debt-equity
ratio" 5 of the issuing corporation must not be greater than 3:1.116
Requirements under the general rule are difficult to ascertain.
Read literally, the general rule would make it necessary for a corpora-
tion to find other corporations that have issued similar instruments in
the same general industry, geographic location, and financial condition.
Such a determination would seem to be extremely difficult and, in some
cases, impossible to make. For example, a determination of the
financial condition would necessarily include an examination of the
corporation's earnings history. Since a new corporation would have no
earnings history, it would be difficult to find a corporation in a similar
financial condition in the same geographic location which would also
satisfy the other conditions mentioned. The regulations do not indicate
that the rule is to be interpreted any way but literally. On the other
hand, the drafters point out that only in rare cases would a corporation
have borrowed money from its shareholders and not from an in-
dependent creditor.' '7 The implication is that evidence of a quote from
a bank or similar lending institution to the corporation will fulfill the
requirements of the general rule. If this is a correct interpretation of
the Secretary's intent concerning the general rule, perhaps some exam-
ples should be added to illustrate the point. Additionally, these exam-
ples could explore the evidence required to prove the quote and
methods for obtaining this evidence. Without these illustrations it may
be argued that the list of factors in the general rule are so broad and
indefinite that very little certainty exists under the regulations. Little
useful guidance is provided to either taxpayers or the Service any time
it is necessary to determine whether a particular interest rate is reason-
able by applying the nebulous general rule.
Perhaps the general rule is intended to codify existing case law
with respect to a reasonable rate of interest. If this assertion is correct,
certainty is even less apparent since courts have recognized that no one
113. The Service plans to announce this rate by issuing a Revenue Procedure. T.D. 7747,
supra note 11, at 86,443.
114. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f)(2)(i)(B) (1982). This provision requires that an interest rate be
equal to or between the four rates identified therein; therefore, an interest rate will not be consid-
ered reasonable under the rule of convenience if it is too high or too low.
115. Defined in Id. § 1.385-6(h). See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
116. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f)(2) (ii) (1982).
117. T.D. 7747, supra note 11, at 86,442.
[Vol. 17:672
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factor is determinative of the reasonableness issue." 8 In other words, a
comparison of interest rates from existing case law would not be in-
formative because the courts considered other relevant factors when
deciding whether an instrument described in a particular case is debt or
equity. Therefore, no definite conclusions can be drawn concerning the
reasonableness of any specific interest rate described in a case.1 19
In summary, the general rule seems to provide a great deal of flex-
ibility with respect to determining the reasonableness of an interest
rate, but virtually no certainty. Clearly, what is needed is a rule that
provides both flexibility and certainty.
Unfortunately, the rule of convenience may have as many short-
comings, if not more, than the general rule. These shortcomings in-
volve the use of the debt-equity ratio in the rule of convenience.
Assuming that an instrument's interest rate satisfies the conditions of
the rule of convenience, 120 a stated interest rate will fail to qualify as
reasonable under the safe harbor if the debt-equity ratio of the issuing
corporation exceeds 3:1.12 Given the confusion which will result from
including a debt-equity test in the rule of convenience for a reasonable
interest rate, it is difficult to understand what purpose is served by ad-
ding such a requirement. Apparently, the Secretary is treating the
debt-equity ratio as a measure of risk 2 2 and feels that a 3:1 ratio is
appropriate given the mechanics of the interest rate test specified in the
rule of convenience.' 23 However, the corporation debt-equity ratio is
but one indication of risk,' 24 and even if the need for such a measure is
118. See supra notes 22-70 and accompanying text.
119. In Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 1031 (1957), the court merely listed the cases which had dealt with the debt-equity prob-
lem, and stated that because each case was decided on the basis of its own particular facts, "no
good purpose would be served by entering upon a review of the decided cases." Id. at 165; see
also Campbell v. Carter Found. Prod. Co., 322 F.2d 827, 832 (5th Cir. 1963).
120. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
121. Treas Reg. § 1.385-6(f)(2)(ii) (1982).
122. The debt-equity ratio has been described as a measure of risk, in that the "greater the
capital of a corporation and the lower its debt, the less subject will the corporation be to the 'strain
and pressure' of financial crises, and the better able to withstand financial setbacks." Spanbock,
Carro & Katz, Nourishing the Thin Corporation, 34 TAXES 687, 688-89 (1956).
123. Because the safe harbor interest rates were criticized as too low and below market rates,
the drafters of the regulations did not feel it necessary to raise the ratio required above 3:1. In
addition, the drafters state that the failure to meet the safe harbor test means only that the corpo-
ration must prove that the interest rate was reasonable under the general rule of Treas. Reg.
§ 1.385-6(t)(1) (1982). T.D. 7747, supra note 11, at 86,443. Of course, this would mean that the
certainty which is the aim of the regulations would be sacrificed.
124. Two commentators have recently employed the techniques of factor analysis and multi-
ple discriminant analysis to study judicial decisions on the classification of debt versus equity in
closely-held corporations. One conclusion is that the courts have placed great significance on the
1982]
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conceded, serious questions may be raised regarding the appropriate-
ness of the particular computation procedure selected.
In general, the debt-equity ratio is defined as the ratio of a corpo-
ration's liabilities to the equity held by stockholders of the corpora-
tion.1 25 When computing the corporation's liabilities, trade accounts
payable, accrued operating expenses, taxes, and similar items are ex-
cluded.' 26 Stockholder's equity is defined as the excess of the adjusted
basis of a corporation's assets over all of its liabilities, computed with-
out excluding any of the liabilities.' 27 The adjusted basis of a corpora-
tion's assets and the amount of its liabilities are to be determined in
accordance with the tax accounting principles properly used by the cor-
poration in determining its taxable income, without regard to the classi-
fication of any interest as stock or indebtedness by reason of section
385, except that preferred stock is considered a liability if it is treated as
indebtedness under the section 385 regulations.' 28
Clearly, the determination of the carrying value of a corporation's
assets is critical to the computation of a proper debt-equity ratio. The
Secretary has selected the adjusted tax basis of the assets as the appro-
priate carrying value based upon the justification that such a carrying
value is a readily determinable and objective amount which provides
certainty to the computations. ' 29 Ease of application and certainty are
clearly important goals, but not at the cost of fairness to the tax-
payer.' 30 Moreover, the use of adjusted basis may not even provide the
financial condition of the corporation. at the time when the instrument was issued. However,
financial condition was evaluated by considering the availability of external financing, the absence
of contingent payments, the business purpose for debt creation, and regular dividend payments, in
addition to the ratio of debt to equity. Moreover, except for regular dividend payments these
other factors seem to be just as significant as the debt-equity ratio. Whittington & Whittenburg,
Judicial Classfication ofDebt Versus Equity-An Empirical Study, Acc'ro. REv. 409, 415 (July,
1980). In addition, standard finance textbooks frequently caution readers against becoming overly
enamored with a single measure of a company's ability to weather times of stress and also meet its
obligations. It is noted that a number of measures (e.g., the current ratio, the acid test ratio, the
total debt to total asset ratio, the long-term debt capitalization ratio, the total debt to total equity
ratio, and the times interest earned ratio) taken together and interpreted in light of competent
professional judgment will "supply some insight into the relative size of the cushion of ownership
funds creditors can rely upon to absorb" the results of any financial setbacks. E. HELFERT, TECH-
NIQUES OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 58-62 (1967); see also J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, ESSENTIALS OF
MANAGERIAL FINANCE 63-64 (3d ed. 1974).
125. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(h)(1) (1982).
126. Id. § 1.385-6(h)(1)(i).
127. Id. § 1.385-6(h)(2). For this purpose, the adjusted basis of the assets does not include
reserves for bad debts or any similar asset offsets. Id.
128. Id. § 1.385-6(h)(3).
129. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, supra note 69, at 18,959.
130. In Liflans Corp. v. United States, 390 F.2d 965, 970 (Ct. Cl. 1968) the Court of Claims
noted: "The prevailing view seems to be that assets are to be taken at fair market value rather
[Vol. 17:672
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alleged certainty. The Secretary argues that, in those areas where the
debt-equity ratio is a primary factor in determining the classification of
instruments, the corporation can avoid any inequities by establishing
that it is, in fact, adequately capitalized.' However, since the debt-
equity ratio is important to the operation of the safe harbor under sec-
tion 1.385-6(g) 132 as well as under section 1.385(f), 133 an unduly restric-
tive method of computing the debt-equity ratio eliminates the certainty
and objectivity intended by these safe harbors. In other words, the use
of adjusted basis should result in a less controversial calculation and
thereby promote certainty since the judgmental intricacies of valuation
are avoided when dealing with the safe harbor rules. Nevertheless, the
use of such a computation procedure together with the selection of the
particular standard for the ratio itself will also reduce the number of
corporations which qualify for the safe harbors. Therefore, the cer-
tainty created by the less controversial calculation of asset carrying val-
ues will be more than offset by the uncertainty created by the restricted
availability of the associated safe harbors. Thus, section 1.385-6(f)(2)
appears to be, for all practical purposes, meaningless as an objective
rule of convenience because the debt-equity ratio requirement unneces-
than at book value when valuing the equity interest in order to compute the ratio." Id. at 970
(quoting Goldstein, Corporate Indebtedness to Shareholders: "Thin Capitalization" and Related
Problems, 16 TAX L. Rv. 1, 19 (1960)); accord Estate of Miller v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 729,
733 (9th Cir. 1956); Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 1956); Nye v.
Commissioner, 50 T.C. 203, 216 (1968); Swoby Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 887, 893 (1947).
The commentators seem to be in agreement that the fair market value of the assets should be used.
Plumb, supra note 14, at 516; see Caplin, supra note 37, at 779; Gerver, De-emphasis of Debt-
Equity Test/or Thin Corporations Requires New Defense Tactics, 23 J. TAX'N 28, 29 (1965); Gold-
stein, Corporate Indebtedness to Shareholders: "Thin Capitalization" and Related Problems, 16
TAX L. REv. 1, 19 (1966); Holzman, The Interest-Dividend Guidelines, 47 TAXES 4 (1969);
Spanbock, Carro & Katz, supra note 122, at 690. Even the Secretary acknowledges that the fair
market value of a corporation's assets provides a more theoretically correct measure of equity than
adjusted basis. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, supra note 69, at 18,959. It
is expressly recognized in I.R.C. § 279(b)(2) (1976) that the historic cost of assets is often an inac-
curate method for determining a corporation's equity. This view that the fair market value of
corporate assets yields a more correct measure of corporate equity than does the adjusted basis of
the assets follows from the view of the essential difference between a creditor and a stockholder.
In essence, a stockholder intends to make an investment and to take the risk of loss so as to enjoy
the profit, if any, while a lender seeks a definite obligation, payable in any event. Thus, it is clear
that the degree of risk plays a part in determining whether there is a creditor or a shareholder
relationship. In determining the degree of risk, a prospective creditor is more concerned with the
fair market value of a potential borrower's assets than the basis because the creditor would want
to know the extent to which a business may suffer losses without adverse consequences to his
interest. The use of any amount other than the fair market value of the corporation's assets is
virtually meaningless with respect to this issue.
131. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, supra note 69, at 18,958.
132. See infra notes 173-86 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 110-116 and accompanying text.
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sarily restricts its availability. 34 Accordingly, this safe harbor will not
relieve the courts, taxpayers, or Service of the many disputes which
arise when the only resort is to the subjective factors of the general rule.
In addition to the determination of asset carrying values, it is nec-
essary to consider the computation of a corporation's liabilities.
Throughout recent accounting history, the equity section of the balance
sheet has been the residue obtained when liabilities are subtracted from
the carrying value of the assets. Accordingly, liabilities are subtracted
from the adjusted basis of the assets in order to determine stockholder's
equity under section 1.385-6(h)(2). For this purpose, trade accounts
payable, accrued operating expenses and taxes, and other similar items
are included in the term "liabilities."' 35 However, when the debt-
equity ratio is computed, by comparing liabilities with stockholder's
equity, these items are excluded from the "liabilities."13 6  Therefore,
the scope of the term "liabilities" is affected by trade accounts payable,
accrued operating expenses, and other similar items. Such items are
accorded special treatment because they vary widely during the year.
If these items were included in the "liabilities" it would "defeat one of
the principal purposes of the regulations, which is to provide a high
degree of certainty for corporations."' 137 Although the final regulations
attempt to clarify when an item will be treated in the same manner as
trade accounts payable, 38 the goal of certainty will not be attained un-
less "other similar items" is interpreted to encompass all of the addi-
tional categories of items which do not represent liabilities for money
borrowed, liabilities for fixed assets purchased or leased, or pension lia-
bilities. Under the final regulations, it appears that a liability must be
incurred to purchase an item of inventory in order to be treated in the
same manner as a trade account payable. 139 Unless this classification
issue is clarified the determination of a corporation's debt-equity ratio
134. It should be noted that the regulations do attempt to compensate for the adjusted basis
inequities in that the only effect of an unfavorable debt-equity ratio will be to require that a
taxpayer meet the heavier evidentiary burden of establishing an actual foundation for the reasona-
bleness of interest charged under the general definition. Nevertheless, the question may be raised
regarding why a taxpayer will be put to his proof on the factual issue of the interest rate which, in
some cases, may be extremely difficult to establish, rather than on the alternative, and possibly less
burdensome, issue of adequate capitalization. In this sense, it may be argued that the adjusted
basis standard works arbitrarily and unnecessarily so.
135. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(h)(2)(ii) (1982).
136. Id. § 1.385-6(h)(1)(i).
137. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, supra note 69, at 18,959.
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will be subject to varying interpretations, resulting in further
uncertainty.
In summary, the complex procedures required to compute the
debt-equity ratio for a particular interest rate to be reasonable under
the safe harbor rule of section 1.385-6(f)(2) suggests that many corpora-
tions will be unable to qualify under this rule of convenience. 4 '
Therefore, whether a particular interest rate is reasonable will have to
be determined under the general rule and its corresponding uncer-
tainty.' 4 1 Although the purpose of the safe harbor for determining the
fair market value of straight debt instruments under section 1.385-
3(a)(2)(i) is to provide a high degree of certainty, it fails in this objec-
tive.142 Additionally, this particular safe harbor is not relevant for hy-
brid securities. In fact, if a hybrid instrument is not registered with the
SEC and sold to the public for money, 143 the fair market value of the
entire instrument must be determined under the ambiguous general
rule. 44
In addition to determining the fair market value of the entire hy-
brid instrument, the application of section 1.385-5(a) requires the deter-
mination of the fair market value of the straight debt payments.145 The
Secretary has attempted to explain the proper method of determining
the amount of a straight debt payment,146 and the examples in the regu-
lations adequately clarify this issue in a variety of situations. 4 7 Section
1.385-5(d)(3) clearly states that the fair market value of the straight
debt payments is the sum of the present value, at the time of the instru-
ment's issuance, of each individual straight debt payments. However,
the calculation of such a sum requires a proper discount rate which is
difficult to determine. The drafters of the regulations have attempted
to provide guidance concerning this crucial issue. 148 Specifically, the
appropriate discount rate is defined as a rate equal to a reasonable rate
of interest within the meaning of section 1.385-6(f)(1) for an instrument
in the amount of the straight debt payment, payable on the date that
the straight debt payment must be made, and payable on the terms and
140. See supra notes 125-39 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 99-100, 108 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
145. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(a)(1) (1982).
146. Id. § 1.385-5(d)(2).
147. I1d. § 1.385-5(0, (g).
148. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, supra note 78, at 166.
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conditions of such straight debt payment. 49 In this case reference is
made to the general rule under section 1.385-6(f)(1) with the result that
the rule of convenience for determining a reasonable rate of interest is
not available. Since the general rule does not provide certainty because
it is difficult to apply,'50 the determination of an appropriate discount
rate under section 1.385-5(d)(4) will be the subject of a great deal of
controversy. Therefore, it will be difficult to determine the fair market
value of the straight debt payments.
The examples in the regulations do not help determine the fair
market value of the entire hybrid instrument because all of the exam-
ples in section 1.385-5 are based upon assumed fair market values' 51
and all of the examples in section 1.385-3(a) deal with straight debt
instruments.'52 Similarly, the examples, with one exception, 53 do not
help determine the proper discount rate to use for valuing straight debt
payments because they are based upon assumed present values.'5 4
These examples illustrate only that various factors such as maturity
time, subordination, and non-interest-bearing status affect the discount
rate. They do not illustrate how to compute the assumed present values
in light of the fact situations described. Therefore, given the impor-
tance of the various uncertainties associated with the determination of
fair market value, the mechanical rule of section 1.385-5(a) is not easily
applied to actual fact situations. Hence, this classification rule may not
provide any greater certainty than existing case law.
B. Classyfcation Rules Applicable Only to Shareholder-Creditors
There are five classification provisions to insure arm's length terms
when an instrument is owned by a shareholder' and four others to
insure arm's length enforcement of an instrument's terms. 5 6 For pur-
poses of this discussion these nine provisions will be classified into two
149. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(d)(4) (1982).
150. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
151. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(f),(g) (1982).
152. Id. § 1.385-3(a)(3).
153. Under § 1.385-5(d)(4)(ii) one example is provided to illustrate the determination of the
proper discount rate. The example assumes that a corporation has outstanding a straight debt
issue registered with the SEC and sold to the public as well as a hybrid issue. The conclusion
reached is that the proper discount rate to be applied to the straight debt payments associated with
the hybrid issue is the market rate being demanded on the straight debt issue. Clearly, this exam-
ple is not useful if the taxpayer does not have straight debt instruments issued to the public.
154. See id. § 1.385-5(f), (g).
155. See id. § 1.385-6(c), -6(e), -6(g), -6(m)(1), -7.
156. See id. § 1.385-6(k), -6(), -6(m)(2), -6(m)(3).
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categories as follows: provisions applicable only when holdings of
stock and instruments are substantially proportionate and provisions
applicable to all shareholder-creditors.
1. Provisions Applicable Only When Holdings of Stock and
Instruments Are Substantially Proportionate
There are eight provisions'57 which apply only to situations where
a taxpayer's holdings of stock and instruments are substantially propor-
tionate. 158 The regulations state that holdings of stock and a class of
instruments are substantially proportionate if the "total overlap factor
with respect to the class of instruments is greater than 50 percent." 159
Holdings are not substantially proportionate if the "corporation's stock
and instruments are widely held and the instruments are separately
traded and readily marketable."' 60 This rule will probably exempt
most publicly held corporations from the associated classification rules.
Also, any instrument held by an independent creditor 16 1 is not re-
garded as being held in substantial proportion to any stock holdings. 62
This exception quite possibly will create uncertainty because the term
"independent creditor" is not clearly defined. Section 1.385-6(b)(1)
merely states that "all relevant facts and circumstances must be consid-
ered in determining whether a creditor is independent."'' 63 A safe har-
bor rule for making this determination is provided to increase
certainty. 64 Under this safe harbor rule a creditor is deemed to be
independent first, if stock owned by the corporation would not be at-
tributed to the creditor under the constructive ownership rules of sec-
tion 318(a), as modified by section 1.385-6(b)(3),' 65 and second, if the
creditor's actual or constructive percentage ownership of the class of
157. See id. § 1.385-6(c), -6(e), -6(g), -6(k), -6(/), -6(m)(l), -6(m)(2), -6(m)(3).
158. Substantially proportionate as determined according to § 1.385-6(a).
159. Defined as the sum of the overlap factors of each person with respect to the class of
instruments where the overlap factor of a person with respect to a class of instruments is the lesser
of the percentage of stock or the percentage of the class of instruments owned, actually or construc-
lively, by the person. Id. § 1.385-6(a)(2)(i) (emphasis added).
160. Id. § 1.385-6(a)(3)(i).
161. This term is defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(b) (1982). See infra notes 163-67 and ac-
companying text.
162. Id. § 1.385-6(a)(3)(ii).
163. This would mean that factors such as the lender's relationship to the corporation and
whether the lender had any loans outstanding to the corporation should be considered. See gener-
ally Hickman, Incorporation and Capitalization: The Threat of the "Potential Income" Item and a
Sensible Approach to Problems of Thinness, 40 TAXES 974 (1962).
164. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(b)(2) (1982).
165. Id. § 1.385-6(b)(2)(i), (ii).
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instruments is at least twice as great as the creditor's actual or percent-
age ownership of either the total combined voting power of all classes
of stock entitled to vote or the total value of shares of all classes of the
corporation's stock. 66
The most troublesome aspect of the safe harbor criteria involves
the application of the attribution rules of section 318(a) as modified.167
Admittedly, a five percent interest would control many, if not most,
large public corporations. If a five percent interest will control a corpo-
ration, it is reasonable to conclude that the owner of such interest is not
an independent creditor. However, in many smaller corporations, it is
possible for a shareholder to have a rather large equity position without
having any real power to influence corporate decision-making. The
minority shareholder in this position must of necessity deal with the
corporation on an arm's length basis in the same manner as an in-
dependent creditor. Therefore, it may be argued that the modification
is designed for situations involving publicly held corporations and that
it is illogical to apply it to loans made to corporations by shareholders
whose percentage ownership is so small that it is unlikely that the indi-
vidual shareholder will have any significant impact upon the affairs of
the corporation. As a result of such a modification, the certainty of the
safe harbor is unlikely to be available with respect to most small
closely-held corporations, and these entities will probably find the gen-
eral rule for determining whether a creditor is independent as confus-
ing and uncertain as existing case law. In addition, the modification of
section 318(a) may create uncertainty in that an investor may be una-
ware that a corporation in which he has a five percent or greater equity
interest is, or may become, a shareholder of a corporation with respect
to which he is a lender. For example, assume B owns one hundred
percent of the stock of Y corporation. Further, assume that B's son
owns five percent of Z corporation. The dropping of the fifty percent
rule of section 318(a)(3)(C) results in Z corporation owning one hun-
dred percent of Y corporation's stock and being considered a share-
holder of Y even though the common shareholder, B, owns only five
percent of Z corporation, and even that interest is attributed through a
related party, B's son. Clearly, Z corporation can hardly exert any in-
fluence over the activities of Y corporation; yet, if Z corporation ad-
166. Id. § 1.385-6(b)(2)(iii).
167. I.R.C. § 318 (1976). In applying the section 318 attribution rules in the context of deter-
mining whether one is an independent creditor, the 50% threshold test of section 318(a)(2)(C) and
318(a)(3)(C) is deemed to require only a 5% interest. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(b)(3) (1982).
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vances money to Y corporation, Z corporation will not be considered
an independent creditor of Y corporation under the safe harbor rule of
section 1.385-6(b)(2).
The most troublesome aspect of the general rule for determining
substantially proportionate holdings also involves the application of the
modified section 318 attribution rules. 168 Although confusion arises in
many situations when the attribution rules are applied, 169 application
of the attribution rules has been simplified for purposes of the section
385 regulations since sideways attribution has been eliminated. 7 0 Nev-
ertheless, determining whether substantial proportionality is present
will be subject to a great deal of uncertainty and litigation whenever
the attribution rules must be applied to determine the relative holdings
of stock and instruments for individual shareholders. This situation
will occur when family members own stock and instruments or when
affiliated corporations are involved. Thus, the provision would seem to
have a rather wide scope of applicability.
If a shareholder's holdings of stock and instruments are substan-
168. See supra notes 159 and 167.
169. See generally B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, CONSTRUCTIVE OWNERSHIP OF STOCK: § 318,
IN FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 9.21 (5th ed. 1981).
170. E.g., shares and debentures are attributed in such a way that one party ends up with the
largest possible holdings and the other parties from whom the shares are attributed are not consid-
ered when the total overlap factor is calculated. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(2)(vii), Example (2)
(1980). B's wife's 100% holding of the common stock of Corporation Y is attributed to B; B's
child's 50% interest in the debentures of Corporation Y is attributed to B; and B's sister's 25%
interest in the debentures of Corporation Y is attributed to B. Thus, B constructively owns 100%
of Corporation Y stock and 75% of Corporation Y debentures. However, the total overlap factors
is computed by considering only B's ownership and his sister's husband's ownership. B's wife,
child, and sister are ignored after the attribution to B has occurred. In other words, the shares and
debentures of all parties to whom the attribution rules apply are aggregated so that the combined
interest is treated as the interest of a single shareholder-lender. See also the hypothetical in the
same example where it is assumed that B is deceased. In this hypothetical B's child's 50% interest
in the debentures is attributed to ''s wife so that she is deemed to own 100% of Y Corporation





B's child) 100% 50% 50%
B's sister 0% 25% 0%
B's sister's
husband 0% 25% 0%
Total Overlap Factor 50%
This result was confirmed by a telephone conversation with Carolyn Swift, Legislation and Regu-
lations Division, Office of the Chief Counsel, Interual Revenue Service (Mar. 1, 1982).
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tially proportionate, there are eight provisions 17 1 which operate to
classify the instruments as stock or indebtedness. 172  First, section
1.385-6(g)(1) states that any instrument which is held by a stockholder
of the issuing corporation, whose holdings of stock and instruments are
substantially proportionate, is classified as stock if the corporation's
debt is excessive immediately after the instruments are issued by the
corporation.173  A corporation's debt is excessive if all of the instru-
ment's terms and conditions, together with the corporation's financial
structure, would not be satisfactory to an independent creditor. 174
However, the regulations provide a safe harbor which states that a cor-
poration's debt is not excessive if the corporation's outside debt-equity
ratio is less than or equal to 10:1, and the corporation's inside debt-
equity ratio is less than or equal to 3:1.175 The outside debt-equity ratio
is computed under section 1.385-6(h) as discussed above. 176 The inside
ratio is determined in the same manner, except liabilities to independ-
ent creditors are excluded when comparing the corporation's liabilities
to shareholder's equity. 177 Both ratios are to be determined at the end
of the year. 178
The underlying justification for this provision is that the creditor
investor has, in circumstances where his investment is subject to a high
degree of risk, placed his money at the risk of the business like a share-
holder, since the likelihood of his being repaid depends significantly
171. See supra note 157.
172. Since eight out of twelve classification rules require substantially proportionate holdings
of stock and instruments before they are applicable, Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6 (1982) is "now the
heart" of the classification rules. Substantial proportionality must exist before any of the rules of
this section apply. See Beghe,.4n Interim Report on the Debt-Equity Regulations Under Code Sec-
tion 385, 59 TAXES 203, 210 (1981). The drafters of the regulations state that proportionality plays
a central role in the regulations because shareholders holding instruments in the same proportion
as their holdings of stock have no economic incentive to negotiate at arm's length when additional
financing is required by the corporation; therefore, regulations were considered necessary in order
to insure that the financing arrangements reflect economic reality. T.D. 7747, 45 Fed. Reg. 86,438,
86,440 (1980). In other words, shareholders holding stock and instruments in the same proportion
are entitled to the corporation's entire net profits and generally will be indifferent, if tax conse-
quences are disregarded, as to whether the profits are withdrawn from the corporation as interest
and principal payments on debt, or as dividends and payments in redemption of stock. See Stone,
Debt-Equity Distinctions in the Tax Treatment ofthe Corporation and its Shareholders, 42 TUL. L.
REv. 251, 258 (1968).
173. Treas Reg. § 1.385-6(g) (1982). The one exception to classification as stock because the
corporation has excessive debt allows instruments which are issued in exchange for an equal or
greater principal amount of indebtedness to escape classification. Id. § 1.385-6(g)(5).
174. Id. § 1.385-6(g)(2).
175. Id. § 1.385-6(g)(3).
176. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
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upon the success or failure of the corporation. 17 9 However, it may be
argued that a capital structure which would be acceptable to an in-
dependent creditor is debatable. In fact, there may be substantial un-
certainty as to whether a particular lender is even an independent
creditor because the safe harbor rule under section 1.385-6(b)(2) may
be inapplicable 8 ' thus forcing the determination to be made under the
general rule of section 1.385-6(b)(1) which does not clearly define in-
dependent creditor.' Therefore, the general rule with respect to when
a corporation's debt is excessive provides little certainty, thus providing
no significant improvement over existing case law. This problem is ag-
gravated by the fact that the safe harbor determines adequate capitali-
zation based upon a purely mechanical rule involving a single factor in
the form of a debt-equity ratio. This test lacks flexibility because one
set of ratios is the single standard by which corporations in many dif-
ferent industries, geographic locations, and financial conditions wil be
judged. The ratio test was developed as an analytic tool for use in the
context of a particular industry rather than as an arbitrary standard.I82
A highly leveraged industry, such as the financial or the real estate in-
dustry, has different capital needs than a manufacturing operation.
The courts have taken into consideration the needs and characteristics
of the particular industry which is involved when applying the ratio
test.' 8 3 Admittedly, the failure of a corporation to pass the safe harbor
test means only that it must establish adequate capitalization under the
general rule, which would consider the industry involved and the other
characteristics peculiar to the corporation.18 4 However, the lack of flex-
ibility with respect to the safe harbor clearly results in a loss of cer-
tainty which is one of the goals of the regulations. In addition, the safe
harbor rule may not provide the anticipated certainty because the
method for determining asset carrying values is very conservative. This
179. See Spanbock, Carro & Katz, supra note 122, at 668-89; see also Gilbert v. Commis-
sioner, 248 F.2d 399, 407 (2d Cir. 1957); Ambassador Apartments, Inc., 50 T.C. 236, 245 (1968),
af'd, 406 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1969).
180. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(g)(2) (1982).
181. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
182. Spanbock, Carro, & Katz supra note 122, at 689; see supra note 124 and accompanying
text.
183. See, e.g., Scotland Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 24 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 265
(1965), where expert testimony was received on whether the company was "adequately capitalized
by the standards of the industry." Id. at 273.
Professor Bittker has stated that what is excessive debt for one industry may be normal for
another, and even within one industry, no corporation is the same as the next. Bittker, Thin Capi-
talization: Some Current Questions, 34 TAXEs 830, 831 (1956).
184. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(g)(2) (1982).
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has the effect of reducing the number of corporations which qualify for
the safe harbor." 5 Finally, there is uncertainty concerning the
mechanics of computing the debt-equity ratio. 18 6
Another provision 8 7 states that an instrument issued by a corpora-
tion to a shareholder is to be classified as stock if. 1) the shareholder-
creditor's holdings of stock and the instruments are substantially pro-
portionate; 88 2) the stated annual rate of interest on the instrument is
not reasonable;' 89 and 3) the issuance of the instrument does not give
rise to original issue discount under Code section 1232(a)(3) or amor-
tizable bond premium under regulation section 1.61-12(c)(2). 90 It is
clear that the Secretary intends to legislate a special rule for cases that
he perceives Congress has overlooked.' 9' Specifically, the Congress has
exempted ratable recognition of original issue discount where, in gen-
eral, a bond or other evidence of indebtedness is issued in exchange for
property. 9 2 Thus, in cases where the stated rate of interest is less than
an arm's length market rate of interest on similar obligations, section
1232 nevertheless provides that no original issue discount exists if the
obligations have been issued in exchange for property. The Secretary
intends to force conformity with arm's length standards in this situation
by simply treating such obligations as stock when the terms are found
to be inconsistent with arm's length terms. Clearly, there is no flex-
185. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
187. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(1) (1982).
188. As determined under id. § 1.385-6(a) and discussed supra notes 159-70 and accompany-
ing text.
189. As determined under Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f) (1982) and discussed supra notes 109-41
and accompanying text. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(2) (1982) specifies that the reasonableness of a
rate of interest for purposes of§ 1.385-6(e)(1) is to be determined on the date that an instrument is
issued.
190. For a complete discussion of the rationale for this condition, see notes 211-19 infra and
accompanying text.
191. The drafters of the regulations state:
Section 1.385-6(c) [now -6(e)] applies primarily to straight debt instruments issued pro-
portionately by a corporation to its shareholders in exchange for property. If a straight
debt instrument is issued to a shareholder for money, there is generally no need for this
rule. In this case, § 1.385-3(a) [now -6(c)] ensures, through the creation of original issue
discount under section 1232(a)(3) and amortizable bond premium under section 1.61-
12(c)(2), that the holders will be paid principal and interest in the proper proportions
... . However, if instruments are issued for property, section 1232(a)(3) and section
1.61-12(c)(2) generally do not apply. Consequently, a special rule is needed to ensure
that the holders will be paid principal and interest in the proper proportions (i.e., in the
same proportions as would be paid to outside creditors). Thus, § 1.385-6(c) imposes the
requirement that interest be paid at a reasonable rate on instruments issued for property.
Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, supra note 69, at 18,961.
192. In such a case, I.R.C. § 1232(b)(2) (1976) sets the issue price equal to maturity value to
avoid dealing with discounts and the amortization of discounts.
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ibility associated with this rule. In addition, there may be a substantial
degree of uncertainty associated with the rule because classification of
stock occurs only if the interest rate is not reasonable. It has been pre-
viously noted that a great deal of uncertainty may be associated with
the determination of a reasonable interest rate. 93 Furthermore, the
rule only applies if a shareholder-creditor's holdings of stock and the
instruments are substantially proportionate, and there is little certainty
with respect to this issue.' 4 It follows that section 1.385-6(e) does not
achieve the desired balance of flexibility and certainty.
Under a third provision, 95 instruments that are payable on de-
mand, 96 and that are owned by shareholders with substantially pro-
portionate holdings of stock and instruments, 9 7 are classified as stock
if the stated annual interest rate on the instruments is not reasonable' 98
on the day of issue. The rationale for this provision may be described
as follows:' 99 If an instrument is due on a fixed date, section 1.385-6(c)
will operate to insure that the fair market value of an instrument is
equal to the consideration paid for it.2°° To the extent that the fair
market value of an instrument differs from its face value at maturity,
either original issue discount under section 1232 or amortizable bond
premium under section 1.61-12(c)(2) is created. This treatment is suffi-
cient to assure that the interest rate is reasonable. 20 1 On the other
hand, if an instrument is payable on demand, neither original issue dis-
count nor bond premium will ordinarily be created under section
1.385-6(c). 2 2 Thus, section 1.385-6(m)(1) is justified under the ration-
ale that the valuation approach to demand instruments will not be ade-
quate to assure that the interest rate is reasonable. Although section
1.385-6(m)(1) does force conformity to arm's length economic reality, it
is subject to the same criticisms with respect to certainty and flexibility
193. See supra notes 109-41 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 159-70 and accompanying text.
195. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(m)(1) (1982).
196. For a complete discussion of the rationale for this condition, see notes 211-19 infra and
accompanying text.
197. As determined under Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a) (1982) and discussed supra at notes 159-70
and accompanying text.
198. As determined under Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f) (1982) and discussed supra at notes 109-41
and accompanying text.
199. This rationale is virtually identical to the justification provided for Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(1)
(1982). See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
200. See infra notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
201. See infra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
202. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, supra note 69, at 18,961.
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as was section 1.385-6(e).2 °3 Similarly, it may be argued that section
1.385-6(m)(1) does not achieve the desired balance of flexibility and
certainty.
To assure consistency with arm's length terms," a fourth provi-
sion applies when proportionately held instruments have a fair market
value different from the consideration paid by a shareholder-credi-
tor.205 In general, the provisions of the regulations under section 385
classify an interest in a corporation as either indebtedness or stock.
However, section 1.385-6(c) requires an interest to be treated partially
as stock and partially as indebtedness. When a corporation issues in-
struments to its shareholders, a determination as to the debt or equity
status of the instruments is made. If the instruments are classified as
indebtedness and if the holdings of the stock and instruments are sub-
stantially proportionate, section 1.385-6(c) requires a comparison of the
fair market value of the instruments with the consideration actually
paid for the instruments. If the consideration paid for an instrument
exceeds its fair market value, the excess generally20 6 is treated as a con-
tribution to capital.20 7 If the fair market value of the instrument ex-
ceeds the consideration paid the excess is generally 20 8 treated as a
distribution to which section 301 applies.20 9 The effect of these speci-
fied treatments is to force the consideration deemed to have been paid
for the instruments to equal the fair market value of the instrument
regardless of the price set by the corporation and its shareholders.
Therefore, the issue price of an instrument will equal its fair market
value since issue price refers to the amount which is deemed to have
been paid for the instrument.210
203. See supra text accompanying notes 193-94.
204. It may be argued that Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(c) (1982) is written primarily to provide the
Commissioner with a final means of attack since this provision is not applied until after a determi-
nation is made as to whether an instrument is debt or equity. Therefore, assuming that a taxpayer
is successful in obtaining a debt classification through the general rule of § 1.385-4(a) and the
numerous exceptions that are contained in the regulations, the Commissioner may still assert
§ 1.385-6(c) in order to force at least part of the taxpayer's instrument to be reclassified into
equity.
205. Id. § 1.385-6(c).
206. Under appropriate circumstances the excess may be treated as a gift followed by a capital
contribution or as compensation for services or as otherwise determined under general principles
of tax law. Id. § 1.385-6(c)(1)(ii).
207. Id.
208. Under appropriate circumstances the excess may be treated as a distribution to which
section 301 applies followed by a gift or as compensation for services or as otherwise determined
under general principles of tax law. Id. § 1.385-6(c)(2).
209. Id.
210. I.R.C. § 1232(b)(2) (1976).
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By establishing the issue price, section 1.385-6(c) also ensures that
principal and interest will be paid on the instruments in the same pro-
portions as would be paid to outside creditors. In order to understand
this point, it is necessary to consider some additional rules. Original
issue discount is defined in section 1232(b)(1) as the difference between
the issue price and the stated redemption price at maturity. Amortiza-
ble bond premium is defined under section 1.61-12(c)(4) as the excess
of the issue price over the amount payable at maturity. If a bond is
sold with original issue discount, the amount of the discount is in-
cluded, ratably over the life of the bond, in the income of the bond
holder.2 1 A corresponding deduction is allowed to the corporation. 212
Likewise, if a bond is sold at a premium the amount of that premium is
included, ratably over the life of the bond, in the income of the corpo-
rate issuer.21 3 A corresponding deduction is allowed to the holder of
the instrument.21 4 Therefore, under the regulation the use of original
issue discount and amortizable bond premium has the effect of adjust-
ing the amount of interest income of the creditor and the interest de-
duction of the corporation to equal the amount of interest income and
deduction which would have resulted if the issue price and interest rate
had conformed to arm's length standards. This adjustment insures that
the allocation of loan repayments between principal and income is
reasonable.
It should be noted that neither original issue discount nor amortiz-
able bond premium is created when an instrument is payable on de-
mand or is issued in exchange for property. If an instrument is payable
on demand, the issue price of the instrument will always equal its
stated redemption price; therefore, there is no original issue discount or
bond premium by definition.215 Likewise, if an instrument which is not
traded on an established securities market is issued for property, the
issue price is deemed to be equal to the stated redempton price at ma-
turity, with the result that there is no discount or premium.2 16 Since the
mechanics of original issue discount and amortizable bond premium
211. I.R.C. § 1232(a)(3)(A) (1976).
212. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-4(a) (1973).
213. Id. § 1.61-12(c)(3) (1980).
214. I.R.C. § 171(a)(1) (1976).
215. A corporation would never issue a demand instrument at a discount because the creditor
could immediately demand the face amount of the instrument. A creditor would never buy a
demand instrument at a premium because the corporation could immediately pay off the debt at
the face amount.
216. I.R.C. § 1232(b)(2) (1976).
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are not available to regulate the interest rates of demand instruments
and instruments issued for property, the Secretary has provided special
rules when arm's length bargaining does not exist.217 This is the justifi-
cation for section 1.385-6(e), 218 dealing with an instrument issued to a
shareholder whose holdings of stock and instruments are substantially
proportionate, and for section 1.385-6(m)(1)," dealing with a demand
instrument issued to a shareholder whose holdings of stock and instru-
ments are substantially proportionate.
The drafters of the regulations assert that section 1.385-6(c) attains
three goals.220 First, it replaces the subjective analysis of case law with
a definite inquiry concerning the fair market value of the debenture.
Second, it remains responsive to the relevant factors identified in the
case law since these factors have direct bearing upon fair market value.
Third, it is easier for the government and the taxpayer to reach a com-
promise. Under case law, the instrument must be either stock or in-
debtedness; there is not much room for compromise.221 However, it
has been noted that since the provision does not avoid or simplify the
general process for classification of instruments as debt or stock,222 the
flexibility touted by the drafters is lacking. This approach will have the
effect of permitting an instrument to have both debt and equity features
without requiring it to be characterized in its entirety as either debt or
equity. The approach also operates to limit the purported tax advan-
tage gained by treating more of any repayment as either interest or
principal. However, these "benefits" are obtained as a result of rules
under which the issuance of an instrument can result, constructively, in
a section 301 distribution, original issue discount, amortizable bond
premium, a contribution to capital, a gift, compensation, or certain
other treatments determined under general principles of tax law. Un-
fortunately, these treatments, as well as the mechanics necessary to im-
plement them,22  will create uncertainty, thus increasing disputes
between taxpayers and the Commissioner. In fact, it is probable that
the difficulties of obtaining taxpayer compliance and enforcing the
rules under this provision will be greater than under existing case law.
217. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, supra note 69, at 18,961.
218. See supra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 195-203 and accompanying text.
220. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, supra note 69, at 18,959.
221. Id.
222. See supra notes 204-10 and accompanying text.
223. E.g., consider the difficulties associated with determining the fair market value of the
instruments. See supra notes 94-142 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, it seems that the burden of imposing such a complex set of
rules, to be applied to constructed facts, will in most cases outweigh any
possible benefits.
In addition to these four provisions which deal with the possibility
that the terms of an instrument will not reflect arm's length economic
reality, there are four other provisions which are applicable when hold-
ings of stock and instruments are substantially proportionate and which
show that there is concern that the terms of an instrument will not be
enforced at arm's length.224 Under existing case law, a failure to en-
force the terms of a debt instrument is considered evidence that the
shareholder and the corporation did not intend to establish a debtor-
creditor relationship at the time the instrument was issued.225 This is
one of the factors considered in determining whether the obligation is
debt or equity.226 The regulations, on the other hand, are not con-
cerned with the subjective intent or expectation of the parties at the
outset. Instead, a "wait and see" attitude is adopted toward instru-
ments which qualify as debt instruments when issued. That is, the reg-
ulations provide for potential reclassification of debt instruments into
stock if the terms of the instruments are not properly enforced. It
should be noted that the rules operate to reclassify an instrument in one
direction only-from indebtedness to stock. Therefore, once an instru-
ment has been classified as stock, it can never again attain debt
status.227
224. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(/)(1) (1982) (This provision treats an instrument as stock if. a corpo-
ration fails to pay all or part of the interest that is due on the instrument during a taxable year, a
shareholder of the issuing corporation is the owner of the instrument and his holdings of stock and
the instrument are substantially proportionate; and, the owner of the instrument fails to pursue
available remedies with the ordinary diligence of an independent creditor.), -6(m)(3) (This provi-
sion provides that if a corporation fails to pay the principal on any instrument within 90 days after
the principal is due and if the holder fails to pursue available remedies with the ordinary diligence
of an independent creditor, the instrument will be treated as a demand instrument from the day
after the date the principal was due), -6(m)(2) (This provision provides that a debt instrument
which is payable on demand, either by its terms or by reason of section 1.385-6(m)(3), and which
is owned by a shareholder of the issuing corporation whose holdings of stock and the instruments
are substantially proportionate will be reclassified as stock as of the first day of the taxable year in
which the interest actually paid during the year on the instrument is not reasonable as determined
under section 1.385-6(f).), -6(k)(l) (This provision states that if a debt instrument is owned by a
shareholder of the issuing corporation, whose holdings of stock and the instruments are substan-
tially proportionate, and if the holder agrees to make a substantive change in the terms of the
instrument, then the instrument is treated as newly issued for property on the day of agreement.).
225. Dillon v. United States, 433 F.2d 1097, 1102 (5th Cir. 1970); Austin Village, Inc. v.
United States, 432 F.2d 741, 745 (6th Cir. 1970); A.R. Lantz Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 1330,
1334 (9th Cir. 1970); Tyler v. Tomlinson, 414 F.2d 844, 849 (5th Cir. 1969); Thompson v. Commis-
sioner, 73 T.C. 878, 895 (1980); Davis v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 814, 836-37 (1978).
226. See supra notes 22-70 and accompanying text.
227. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-4(b)(1) (1982).
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Although these provisions effectively implement the "conformity
with arm's length standards" philosophy, they appear to provide little
flexibility. For instance, the rule relating to a change in the terms of an
existing debt obligation, which provides for the reexamination of such
obligation under the various tests set forth in the regulations following
any substantive modification, 28 seems reasonable and equitable upon
first examination. Although this may be true with respect to large pub-
licly-held corporations, this may not be the case with respect to small
corporations. It is not at all uncommon for small business lenders to
liberalize the terms of a debt instrument as the borrowing company's
financial position improves, to renegotiate the terms either as a bor-
rower's financial condition deteriorates, or to accomodate new infu-
sions of debt or equity capital as long as the lender's position as a state
law creditor remains intact. The rule on substantive changes in terms
would appear to unduly restrict the shareholder-lender's flexibility and
ability to deal effectively with the problems of a small corporation by
structuring and restructuring financing relative to the flexibility and
ability of an arm's length lender.
In addition, these provisions may not provide more certainty rela-
tive to existing case law. For instance, under two of these provisions2 29
it is necessary to determine what constitutes "the ordinary diligence of
an independent creditor" in analyzing whether a debt instrument will
be reclassified as stock. The evil feared by the Secretary is that a share-
holder may not enforce his rights as a creditor to the detriment of his
rights as a shareholder.2 30 But it is not clear what standard the Secre-
tary will use in determining whether a shareholder has exercised the
"ordinary diligence of an independent creditor" in protecting his rights
as a creditor. Hopefully, the Secretary will not adopt the conservative
bank lender as a model in applying this section. This would not con-
form with the case law, which generally does not require a shareholder-
creditor to be as strict as a conservative banker,23' as long as he acts in
the same manner as an independent creditor.2 32 This position is based
on the realities of the lending industry because, in practice, all lenders
are not conservative bankers. Many times a firm is unable to meet its
228. Id. § 1.385-6(k)(1).
229. Id. § 1.385-6(0, -6(m)(3).
230. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, supra note 69, at 18,962.
231. Earle v. W.J. Jones & Son, 200 F.2d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 1952); Charles E. Curry, 43 T.C.
667, 681 (1965); Motel Co. v. Commissioner, 22 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 825, 833 (1963), afj'd
on other grounds, 340 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1965).
232. Plumb, supra note 14, at 495.
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current obligations due to temporary cash flow problems or some other
unforeseen circumstances. If there is a reasonable expectation for suc-
cess in the future, it is to the lender's benefit to bear with a financially
troubled corporation until its financial health improves. However, if a
shareholder-lender does so by foregoing interest payments or by post-
poning the maturity date, the Secretary could apply a conservative
bank lender standard and interpret this action as a refusal to enforce
creditor rights to the detriment of shareholder rights. The loan would
then be reclassified as stock.
It seems that the drafters of the regulations believe that a less rig-
orous standard will be applied. In response to comments concerning
the proposed regulations, the drafters state that the "Treasury recog-
nizes that independent creditors do not always bring suit" to enforce
their rights.3 3 To clarify this point, an example was added to the final
regulations which provides that past payment history, pledge of collat-
eral by the debtor corporation, and other unspecified facts and circum-
stances may warrant the shareholder-creditor's failure to file suit.234
However, the vagueness of the standard used by this section may allow
the Secretary to insist upon more action by a shareholder-creditor
where the Secretary feels that there is a tax avoidance scheme involved.
In addition, as matters now stand, the subjective nature of the standard
used in this provision is bound to engender numerous disputes and
costly litigation by forcing a determination as to what a hypothetical
creditor would do in a similar situation. Because of the cyclical opera-
tions of many small corporations, it is not unusual for an independent
creditor to work with a financially troubled debtor by extending the
time for payment, lowering the interest rate either temporarily or per-
manently, allowing lump sum payments to be made in advance of or
after due dates, or making other special arrangements. How should the
closely-held corporation and its creditor-shareholder assess and estab-
lish what legal remedies should be taken by an independent creditor or
what concessions such a creditor should make? This question is partic-
ularly troublesome because the degree of diligence with which an in-
dependent creditor pursues available remedies will vary to a large
degree depending upon numerous factors. Some of these factors in-
clude: the potential earnings of the debtor; geographic location; alter-
native investment opportunities for the creditor; the creditor's prior
233. T.D. 7747, 45 Fed. Reg. 86,438, 86,443.
234. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6()(2) Example (3).
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success or failure with the debtor corporation or similar businesses; the
general state of the economy, nationwide and in the local community;
and the lendor's interest in the scientific or innovative aspects of the
debtor's business. Therefore, it is arguable that the probable result of
this provision would be to convert debt to stock whenever a corpora-
tion had financial difficulties and was unable to pay the accrued inter-
est or principal to one of its shareholders whose holdings of stock and
instruments are substantially proportionate, without regard to these
factors which would mitigate this situation.
2. Provisions Applicable to All Shareholder-Creditors
There is only one relevant classification provision which is appli-
cable to instruments held by creditors who are also shareholders even
when holdings of stock and instruments are not substantially propor-
tionate.235 Under this provision, if a loan is made to a corporation by
any party other than an independent creditor,2 36 and within 120 days
after the end of the taxable year in which the loan is made, there is not
a legally enforceable written document, containing all of the material
terms and conditions of the loan, section 1.385-7(b) will operate to
classify the loan as debt or equity. Generally, such informal obliga-
tions are treated as indebtedness.237 However, such loans will be
treated as a contribution to capital if, when the loan is made, the debtor
corporation has excessive debt238 as defined in section 1.385-6(g). 239
The requirement that the corporation be inadequately capitalized indi-
cates that the danger of informal shareholder advances is not that they
are per se tax avoidance vehicles, but rather that in certain circum-
stances they are likely to merge into the shareholder's equity and repre-
sent money which, in economic reality, is subject to the risk of the
business. To further force consistency with arm's length relationships,
if an unwritten obligation has been classified as indebtedness, and if the
debtor-corporation fails to pay interest on the loan at a reasonable
rate240 during any taxable year of the debtor-corporation, then the loan
is reclassified as a contribution to capital as of the latter of the first day
235. Id. § 1.385-7.
236. As defined under id. § 1.385-6(b) and discussed supra, notes 163-67 and accompanying
text.
237. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7(b)(1) (1982).
238. Id. § 1.385-7(b)(2).
239. See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
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of such taxable year or the date of the loan.241 Once a loan is reclassi-
fied, its status as a contribution to capital can never change.
242
Since section 1.385-7 applies to all shareholder-lenders who are
not independent creditors, uncertainty is created because the term "in-
dependent creditor" is not clearly defined.243 Otherwise, the provision
seems to offer a proper balance between certainty and flexibility with
respect to unwritten obligations. 2'
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The courts have consistently applied a multi-factor approach in
order to determine the "substantive intent of the parties" when faced
with the problem of distinguishing debt from equity. Essentially this
approach involves analyzing the facts and circumstances surrounding
the creation of an interest for the purpose of ascertaining the nature of
the interest and the intent of the parties. The questionable interests are
then classified, as debt or equity giving due consideration to what the
parties say they did, interpreted in light of the economic substance of
the actual transaction.245
Essentially, the regulations determine the proper classification by
utilizing a narrower arm's length standard, even though various provi-
sions in the regulations do allow one or more other factors which have
been identified by the courts to interact with the arm's length standard.
In general, the regulations employ various tests regarding an instru-
ment's form, the relationship of the entity to instrument holders, and
the entity's capital structure to determine whether the regulations are
applicable. If the regulations are applicable, an interest will be class-
ified based upon a comparison of its actual terms with abstractly de-
fined arm's length terms. Such terms are abstractly defined in the sense
that they are specified without any reference to the facts and circum-
stances associated with the negotiation of these terms.
Under the arm's length approach of the regulations, any interest
will be treated as stock unless it either results from arm's length negoti-
ations or unless its terms are consistent with terms which would have
241. Treas Reg. § 1.385-7(c)(1) (1982).
242. Id. § 1.385-7(d)(2).
243. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
244. E.g., shareholder-lenders have until 120 days after the close of the tax year in which the
loan is made to either pay off the loan or issue a written instrument. Treas Reg. § 1.385-7(a)(1)(ii),
7(a)(2)(i) (1982).
245. See supra notes 22-61 and accompanying text.
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resulted from arm's length negotiations. An instrument issued to a
shareholder will be subject to particular scrutiny and will be considered
stock unless its terms clearly reflect arm's length economic reality as
described by broad general rules or by various "safe harbor"
provisions.
The debt versus equity question is a complex one, and there is a
need for more certainty in this area. However, it may be argued that
the arm's length standard is not appropriate because it depends upon
the perceptions, objectives, and judgments of individual parties in light
of specific facts and circumstances. Therefore, it is arguable that arm's
length standards cannot be abstractly defined.246 Failure to consider
all of the facts and circumstances in determining the existence of arm's
length transactions reduces flexibility and may cause artificial transac-
tions as taxpayers attempt to have interests reflect existing facts and
circumstances as well as conform to the abstract criteria in the regula-
tions. It follows that the arm's length standard is appropriate only if
the application of such a standard will provide greater certainty than
current case law, while at the same time allowing sufficient flexibility to
be responsive to the individual needs of specific investors and corporate
entities. Examination of the regulations discloses the intent to satisfy
these conflicting objectives but little success in accomplishing this goal.
Certainty is ostensibly provided by numerous safe harbors.247
This certainty does not materialize for two reasons. First, the criteria
which must be met in order to fall within these safe harbors tend to be
so restrictive that these areas of certainty are unavailable to a signifi-
cant portion of corporate taxpayers. 248  Moreover, it may be argued
that many of the safe habors are designed to be applicable to public
corporations rather than small corporations.249 This result is consistent
246. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
247. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, supra note 69, at 18,958.
248. See Treas Reg. § 1.385-6(f)(2) (The debt-equity ratio requirement and the method of
computing it whereby stockholder's equity is determined with reference to adjusted basis, will
result in many corporations being unable to qualify under the safe harbor for a reasonable interest
rate.), -6(g)(3) (Adequate capitalization is determined by debt-equity ratio computations under
this safe harbor, however, there is a single ratio to be applied to all corporations and stockholder's
equity is computed using adjusted basis rather than fair market value.).
249. See id. § 1.385-3(a)(2)(ii) (safe harbor for determining the fair market value requires in-
struments to be registered with the SEC and sold to the public for money), -6(a)(3)(i) (specifies
that holdings of instruments and stock are not substantially proportionate if the instruments and
stock are widely held and the instruments are separately traded and readily marketable),
-6(b)(2)(iii)(3) (safe harbor which specifies that a creditor is independent if his percentage owner-
ship of instruments is at least twice as great as his percentage ownership of stock and if there is no
attribution under section 318 as modified by substituting a 5% threshold test for the 50% test of
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with the arm's length standard since the terms of instruments issued by
public corporations are likely to have been negotiated at arm's length,
whereas the terms of those issued by closely-held corporations to share-
holders are not likely to be the result of arm's length negotiations.
Nevertheless, the regulations require arm's length terms primarily in
those situations where arm's length negotiations are not present.
Therefore, it seems inappropriate to have the areas of certainty defined
to apply primarily to situations involving arm's length negotiations
since these safe harbors will obviously not be available to the very cor-
porations that are most affected by the regulations. Second, the appli-
cation of numerous safe harbor provisions depends upon factors which
are highly subjective in many instances, raising the question as to
whether any significant degree of certainty is actually provided by the
safe harbors even when they are applicable. °
The actual degree of certainty provided by the regulations is also
questionable since many of the classification rules are either difficult to
understand or to apply.2 5 ' By departing from the subjective standards
of present case law in favor of an "objective" approach with its own
subjective standards, the Secretary may ultimately accomplish only the
substitution of one uncertain body of case law for another as taxpayers
section 318(a)(2)(C) and 318(a)(3)(C)), -6(f)(2) (The debt-equity ratio requirement under the safe
harbor test for a reasonable interest rate is high when compared with the debt-equity ratio of
public corporations but low when compared with that of smaller corporations.).
250. See id. § 1.385-3(a)(2)(i) (safe harbor for determining FMV requires a reasonable interest
rate), -6(a)(3)(ii) (safe harbor specifies that holdings of stock and instruments are not substantially
proportionate if held by an independent creditor, yet determining whether a taxpayer is an in-
dependent creditor is a very subjective process), -6(f(2) (safe harbor for a reasonable interest rate
requires computation of the corporate debt-equity ratio and the regulations are not clear as to how
to compute corporate liabilities for this purpose), -6(g)(3) (safe harbor for determining adequate
capitalization requires computation of the corporate debt-equity ratio and the regulations are not
clear as to how to compute corporate liabilities for this purpose).
251. See id. § 1.385-5(a) (A mechanical test is applied to classify hybrid instruments, but the
objective test depends upon a determination of fair market value which is a subjective factor.),
-6(f)(1) (The general rule for determining a reasonable interest rate is very ambiguous.), -5(d)(4)
(The definition of the proper discount rate to be used for valuing straight debt payments specifies
a rate equal to a reasonable interest rate within the ambiguous general rule specified in section
1.385-6(f)(1).), -6(b)(1) (the general rule for determining whether a creditor is independent is am-
biguous), -6(a)(2) (The use of attribution rules when ascertaining whether holdings of stock and
instruments are substantially proportionate is confusing and uncertain.), -6(g)(2) (The general rule
for determining whether debt is excessive depends upon a subjective evaluation by a hypothetical
independent creditor.), -6(g)(3) (The safe harbor for determining whether debt is excessive de-
pends upon computing debt-equity ratios; yet, the regulations are not clear regarding how to com-
pute corporate liabilities for this purpose.), -6(e) (Classification as stock depends upon whether an
instrument's interest rate is reasonable and that is a subjective process.), -6(m)(l) (Classification as
stock depends upon whether an instrument's interest rate is reasonable and that is a subjective
process.), -6(c) (Operation of this provision requires a determination of fair market value as well
as the creation of constructive inflows and outflows.).
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are forced to resort to the courts for interpretation. The courts have
spent forty years developing the present touchstones which measure
"substantive intent." Under these regulations they may spend the next
forty years defining the arm's length standard.
Flexibility is said to be provided by rules which allow an interest
to be classified as either debt, equity, or both.252 In addition, flexibility
seems to require that the arm's length standards be responsive to the
facts and circumstances surrounding the issuance of the instruments in
question. Under these two standards for evaluating flexibility, many of
the general rules are clearly flexible; however, these rules appear to be
so indefinite that more uncertainty is created than under existing case
law for those taxpayers who are unfortunate enough to find the rele-
vant safe harbors unavailable.253
In summary, the safe harbors as presently drafted appear to be too
narrowly defined to afford a substantial degree of certainty to those
corporations most likely to bear the burden of compliance with these
regulations. On the other hand, the general rules which provide flex-
ibility offer even less guidance and certainty than existing case law.
Furthermore, other rules within the regulations provide neither flex-
ibility nor certainty because they are purely mechanical rules which
depend upon subjective factors for their operation.25 4
These problems indicate that the regulations focus too extensively
on arm's length relationships. Therefore, another philosophical ap-
proach may be necessary before the desired balance between certainty
and flexibility can be achieved. However, since courts have failed to
delineate specific guidelines to distinguish debt from equity, this may
indicate that this area of tax law cannot be governed by specific rules,
252. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, Supra note 69, at 18,958.
253. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a)(1)(i) (1982) (Fair market value is defined as the price that
would be negotiated by a willing buyer and a willing seller having reasonable knowledge of all
relevant facts.), -6(b)(1) (All relevant facts and circumstances must be taken into account when
determining whether one is an independent creditor.), -6(f(1) (A reasonable interest rate is within
the range of rates paid to independent creditors in the same general industry, geographic location,
and financial condition as the taxpayer.), -6(g)(2) (A corporation has excessive debt if all of the
terms and conditions of an instrument, together with the corporation's financial structure, would
not be acceptable to an arm's length lending institution.).
254. See id. § 1.385-5(a) (purely mechanical test depending upon estimates of the fair market
value), -6(e)(l) (an inflexible rule depending upon substantially proportionate holdings of stock
and instruments as well as determination of a reasonable interest rate), -6(m)(l) (an inflexible rule
depending upon substantially proportionate holdings of stock and instruments as well as determi-
nation of a reasonable interest rate), -6(/) (an inflexible rule depending upon substantially propor-
tionate holdings of stock and instruments as well as a determination as to what constitutes the
ordinary diligence of an independent creditor).
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but rather requires an analysis of the relevant factors in each case.
Thus, it may be appropriate for Congress to reconsider the authority
granted to by the Secretary by section 385. General public policy
seems to support a reconsideration of this congressional delegation of
authority.
Since the regulations tend to use market standards to determine if
an instrument held by a shareholder is debt, large corporations, which
obtain most of their capital from outsiders, will not generally be sub-
jected to the regulations. Small corporations will bear the greatest bur-
den of compliance with these regulations because they simply do not
have the access to capital or debt markets that larger corporations en-joy,2 5 and therefore depend heavily upon shareholder financing, both
temporary and long-term. Clearly, this result is consistent with the
"conformity with economic reality" policy which the Secretary is trying
to implement.256 On the other hand, Congress has also recognized the
important role that small businesses play in our society. For example,
Congress has stated that the economic well-being and security of the
nation "cannot be realized unless the actual and potential capacity of
small businesses is encouraged and developed. ' 257 To implement this
goal, laws have recently been enacted to "encourage" federal agencies
to structure the regulations they issue so there will be no unnecessary
adverse effects on small businesses, 258 and to amend federal laws so
that business enterprises, "particularly small, growing, and financially
troubled enterprises, can. . . readily raise needed capital."25 9 Thus, it
may be argued that congressional intent was not to provide a frame-
work for rules so stringent that small business corporations, which can-
not generally resort to outside financing, would be unduly penalized.
Yet, it is -arguable that at least some of the provisions in the regulations
will have that result.260 It follows that the section 385 regulations may
255. Grever, supra note 130, at 28.
256. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
257. 15 U.S.C. § 631 (1976). This statement is part of the declaration of policy underlying the
Small Business Act, Pub. L. No. 85-536, 67 Stat. 232 (1953) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-646
(1976)). This Act established the Small Business Administration.
258. S. REP. No. 878, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980). The legislation described is the Regula-
tory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980).
259. H.R. REP. No. 1341, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980). This Act, the Small Business Invest-
ment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (1980), amends the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-bbbb (1976) and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-bbbb
(1976) among other acts.
260. Eg., the rules requiring arm's length enforcement of an instrument's terms are based
upon the premise that a shareholder will be indifferent whether he receives economic benefits
from the corporation in the form of interest payments, dividends, or increases in the value of his
1982]
40
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 17 [1981], Iss. 4, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol17/iss4/2
TULSA LAW JO URiVAL [Vol. 17:672
operate to stifle small corporations and, consequently, that they are
contrary to public policy. In other words, while arm's length dealings
with one's own corporation are theoretically desirable, the practical re-
alities of financing such an entity may cause this goal to be
unrealistic. 26'
stock since he owns an equity interest in the corporation as well as an interest as a creditor. It
follows that the existence of indebtedness, as an interest separate and apart from the equity inter-
est, is a sham when a shareholder fails to strictly enforce the terms of a debt instrument. With the
exception of the "ordinary diligence of an independent creditor" standard, the meaning of which
is extremely subjective, this reasoning and the arm's length enforcement rules seem to ignore the
fact that shareholder-creditors of closely-held corporations may be required to postpone or change
the terms of an instrument in order to keep a corporation viable. Moreover, these rules also seem
to ignore the fact that nonshareholder creditors often have to modify the terms of an instrument if
they hope to recover their principal. It should be noted that extensions of time to pay have been
granted to Chrysler Corporation by numerous lenders of millions of dollars. Obviously, these
lenders granted extensions on their loans because they believed that their financial interest would
be preserved. Shareholder-creditors of small corporations may also feel that it is to their advan-
tage to grant extensions for payment on their loans for the same reason. See supra notes 229-34
and accompanying text. In addition, the excessive debt rule stated in Reg. § 1.385-6(g) appears to
reach results which are inconsistent with existing financing realities. Small corporations are likely
to have excessive debt for two reasons. First, in its beginning years, a corporation generally must
rely heavily upon debt as it establishes good business relations and develops a history of earning
capacity. Second, it is not uncommon, and is sometimes desirable from a legal standpoint, to
incorporate with as little net worth as possible. This is because most start-up situations involve the
venturer's lifetime savings plus outside debt. The idea is to minimize the proportion of personal
capital at risk and also to create a means for returning those previously taxed savings to the owner
tax-free. Incorporations of this type, or course, give rise to loans that have in the past created the
debt or equity controversies. The regulations intend to lock those life-time savings into a taxable
position if withdrawn. It may be argued that such a result is consistent with sound economic and
financial theory, but that it ignores the practical realities of small corporation financing. See supra
notes 173-86 and accompanying text.
261. On June 23, 1982, the Internal Revenue Service announced that the § 385 rules will not
go into effect before January 1, 1983, providing additional time for Treasury Department and the
Service to consider comments on proposed revisions and to publish them in final form.
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